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WPA HQs 1 July 2023, Celebrating Independence Declaration July 1st, 1971
On 8 January 2007, in the British House of Lords, Lord Harries of Pentregarth rose to ask her Majesty’s government what representations they were making to further the independence of West Papua.
They say that a picture speaks a thousand words. If that’s true, then a hostage video must speak at least a million. The only problem with this technology and indeed most technology is that most of these words tend to get garbled when they’re all being shouted at once. This deluge of information often results in a sort of narrative overdose that makes my head spin. That is the dilemma I face when watching the videos that have surfaced online of Philip Mehrtens, a 37-year-old bush pilot from New Zealand taken hostage deep in the jungles of the Indonesian-occupied region of West Papua this February. In the few clips of footage made available to the public to prove that this man is in fact still alive, Mr. Mehrtens appears wide-eyed and dislodged, like a tourist lost on a different planet. He stands as tall and as pale as a ghost, dressed in a denim jacket and a Boonie cap, surrounded by dark men with bushy beards and furious eyes.
One thing that is hard for anyone to deny about this footage is that those reems make it crystal clear that this captured Kiwi has stumbled smack dab in the middle of something which he too is struggling against reason to comprehend. However, I can’t seem to ignore the fact that his captors appear to be just as frightened and out of place as their own hostage. Armed with an odd assortment of assault rifles, bows and arrows and dressed to the nine in a clashing hodgepodge of tribal headdresses, war paint, and second-hand military fatigues, these men who the Western media has largely written off as quixotic savages somehow look strangely familiar to my own furious eyes.
The only words that my mind can collect to make sense of the fear and loathing that I somehow share with Philip Mehrtens’ kidnappers tells me that on the other side of the planet there are men who are also at war with the modern world. The same one that haunts my dreams with menacing footage of freeways and skyscrapers that scream a million words a second in my face, that looming metropolis that holds my soul hostage and stirs a terror deep inside me that smug doctors in white lab coats diagnose as a mental illness. Those dark men with their bushy beards and furious eyes clearly share my private war but unlike me they refuse to lose it in the privacy of a psychiatrist’s office, and they refuse to allow the terror we share to rob them of the dignity of not going down without a hostage. God bless them.
Those men are the soldiers of the West Papuan National Liberation Army, the armed wing of the Free Papua Movement and I am not ashamed to admit that I admire them. They are a poorly armed and loosely affiliated collection of hunter-gatherers and subsistence farmers from ancient rival clans who have been united over the last half-century by a shared struggle for the liberation of their own tiny corner of nowhere which has long been cruelly occupied by the colossal juggernaut of the Indonesian Army and its colonialist backers in the United States, the E.U., Australia and New Zealand.
It is in fact the financial and military support of those Western hegemons that has led this mighty little army to kidnap Philip Mehrtens from his single-engine passenger plane in a desperate attempt to hold one of Babylon’s own for ransom. That ransom originally took the form of a bold demand for nothing less than full international recognition for West Papua’s independence but has since been reduced to simple access to UN peacekeepers. Indonesia’s counteroffer was delivered by heavily armed commandos sent to rescue Mehrtens Rambo-style, but the West Papuans sent these western trained killers back to Jakarta wrapped in body bags. In the only hostage video released since, Mehrtens appears alive and well to condemn Indonesia for resorting to dropping bombs on his position in the mountainous Nduga region in the wake of this failed raid.
The fact that most of the Western media has covered almost none of this story is nothing new so I will do my very damnedest to catch you up on the modern world’s long war against the stubborn people of West Papua. Indonesia is a vast archipelago of 38 provinces spread across thousands of Islands. West Papua is the easternmost territory in this expanse and the western half of the island of New Guinea which is the second largest island on earth after Greenland and home to the world’s second-largest rainforest after the Amazon. Like all too many third world inventions, Indonesia isn’t so much a singular cohesive nation state as it is a colonialist conglomeration cobbled together by the Dutch when they took its islands by force in the late 19th century.
After the fiery imperial implosion of the Second World War shattered the white man’s grip on Southeast Asia, a former Japanese collaborator named Sukarno attempted to unite the many tribes of Indonesia under one flag in opposition to Western imperialism. In doing so, this otherwise courageous leader secured his new nation’s independence in 1949 but also sowed the seeds for decades of civil war and genocide by trying to use the western contraption of the Westphalian nation state to overcome the reach of his former masters.
The Dutch managed to retain control over West Papua in one last stand but with America’s support, Sukarno invaded in 1961. The West Papuans attempted to declare independence the same year but quickly found themselves under attack by their supposed liberators for threatening the cohesion of the new Indonesian nation state. The UN officially took control of the region in 1962 and supervised what has been widely acknowledged by most international observers to be a totally fraudulent election on West Papua’s fate in 1969.
Only 1,026 representatives handpicked by the Indonesian military out of a population of 1 million were allowed to choose their nation’s fate at barrel of a gun in what the UN had the gall to declare an Act of Free Choice. Over 30,000 West Papuans had been slaughtered during the 8-year occupation that proceeded this vote. Considering that this slaughter was overseen by Suharto, the brigadier general chosen by the CIA to take Sukarno’s place in 1965, it can hardly be considered shocking that his electoral hostages voted overwhelmingly in favor of their own subjugation.
1969 was also the year that Suharto held a conference in Geneva for the multinational elites who bankrolled his bloody coup. During this bougie soiree Suharto’s fascist New Order junta essentially carved up Indonesia’s natural resources and handed them over to the highest bidder piece by piece. In West Papua’s case, that highest bidder would be the massive Anglo-American Freeport Mining Company whose board members included then National Security Advisor and future Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Freeport would open what would become the world’s largest goldmine in West Papua, reducing a sacred mountain to a bottomless pit and either murdering or displacing thousands in the process. This toxic hellhole would become Indonesia’s single greatest source of revenue, pulling a million dollars a day from the earth before handing $33 billion dollars of the loot over to the jackals back in Jakarta between 1992 and 2004 alone.
Of course, none of this wealth would find its way back to the people of West Papua, 38% of which continue to live in poverty to this day. But the West Papuan people were treated to all the splendor of the modern world in a 50-year military occupation that continues to rage quietly as we speak. While Freeport counts their gold, over 500,000 civilians have been slaughtered in a massive spree of genocides against any indigenous tribe too proud to bow to progress. That’s over 10% of the population. Women and children have been systematically raped, massive highways have been paved over mass graves, villages have been burnt to the ground during routine military sweeps, towers have been erected to house foreign investors and their mistresses, concentration camps have been carved out of the jungle and the Coca-Cola has flowed like wine and the sweet smoke of Menthol Marlboros has stained the air.
And of course, America the Beautiful has been there every step of the way with her billions of dollars in guns and lethal aid awarded to the most savage death squads that money can buy, often all in the name of fighting terrorism. But most of the victims of Indonesia’s final solution in West Papua don’t even carry guns. In 1998, the entire village of Biak was loaded onto ships by the Indonesian Military and thrown into the ocean. Some 200 people, most of them women and children, drowned. Their act of terrorism was raising a flag that declared their independence from a cruel world that has violently intervened on their way of life. A way of life built on traditional Melanesian social contracts among hundreds of clans and marked by an absence of Western style hierarchies or even Indonesian-style chiefs. A way of life governed only by the will of the village.
West Papua’s war isn’t just a war against subjugation and genocide. It is a war against the forced homogeny of Western civilization that those crimes serve. It is a war against a single world order with a single tribe of assimilated consumers. It is a war against the dislocation of humanity from the natural world and the dislocation of the natural world from the divine. It is a war against madness. I will concede that it is indeed a tragedy that innocent men like Philip Mehrtens have been caught up in this war, but I would also argue that it is far more tragic that the rest of us have not been considering that we too are the victims of this madness. Even with all the gold that we could steal from West Papua, the West is a desert of pathological loneliness, mass shootings and environmental devastation. We are literally choking on the fumes of the modern world that West Papua has decided they would rather die fighting than join. Maybe it is we who should join them.
Then again, maybe that’s just the mental illness talking again. The narrative of another burnt-out casualty of suburban decay during the heat of the Kali Yuga. But what else can I give when I find myself lost in the eyes of quixotic savages on the internet? My narrative is the only arrow that I have left in my quiver. This week that narrative belongs to West Papua for whatever little that’s worth.
Nicky Reid is an agoraphobic anarcho-genderqueer gonzo blogger from Central Pennsylvania and assistant editor for Attack the System. You can find her online at Exile in Happy Valley.
SEPTEMBER 6, 2019
low-level insurgency has bubbled away in the Indonesian provinces of Papua and West Papua since the early 1960s, when Dutch colonialists withdrew from the territory and Indonesia moved in as temporary administrators.
A referendum on independence was agreed under a UN-brokered deal but the vote, held in 1969 and widely regarded as a sham (some have nicknamed it the “act of no choice”), allowed just 1026 locals chosen by Indonesia to vote – and they voted unanimously for incorporation into Indonesia.
The most recent protests have seen several people killed, buildings set on fire and violence on the streets. Thousands of people have taken part in protests all over the country, flying the banned Morning Star flag and demanding independence.
Indonesian authorities deported four Australians from West Papua. It was alleged they had participated in pro-independence protests.
So what is behind all the tension in Papua? Why are these protests happening now? And what will Indonesia do about them?
The current unrest is diplomatically sensitive for Australia and Indonesia – memories of Australia’s key role in East Timor’s independence have not faded. Some in the Jakarta political and military establishment fear Australia could one day come out in support of Papuan independence but successive governments have stressed that Australia respects Indonesia’s territorial integrity.
Papua, formerly known as Irian Jaya, is on Australia’s doorstep – it’s only about 500 kilometres away as the crow flies – and Australia is home to many Papuan activists who advocate for an independent Papua.
West Papua and Papua are on the same island as Papua New Guinea, which occupies the eastern side of the land mass. PNG has never been part of Indonesia.
About 3.5 million people live in Indonesian Papua, a tiny fraction of Indonesia’s population of about 260 million people. It was only in 2003 that West Papua was hived off and a second province created. Together, the provinces were once known as Irian Jaya, but the name Papua was adopted (in line with local preferences) soon after former president Megawati Sukarnoputri granted limited autonomy to the province in 2002.
This autonomy allowed the provinces to retain most of the revenue generated from the extraction of natural resources such as oil and gas – deposits of gold, copper, silver, petroleum, natural gas and coal are also still largely untapped. It was also designed to head off the desire for Papuan independence.
And it was hoped that additional autonomy would help lift Papuans out of grinding poverty. Papua and West Papua are two of the poorest, most corrupt provinces in Indonesia. The poverty rate is more than 20 per cent compared to a national rate of 9.4 per cent.
The World Bank notes that, although the provinces are rich in resources, economic development is “unusually challenging” because of geography – “steep mountains, swampy lowlands, fragile soils and heavy seasonal rainfall” – and due to low population density and extreme cultural fragmentation.
On average, people earn less and don’t live as long. The two provinces lack access to basic services such as health and education. They also lack crucial infrastructure compared to much of the rest of the country.
Providing some autonomy hasn’t really worked to head off trouble. Deadly clashes between armed rebels and Indonesian security forces are a regular occurrence, as are attacks on workers building a new trans-Papua highway and on resources projects such as the huge Grasberg gold and copper mine (in which Indonesia last year took a majority stake).
The most recent protests began soon after August 17, Indonesia’s national independence day, when 43 Papuan students in Surabaya, East Java, were arrested for allegedly damaging the Indonesian flag.
Video of security forces who arrested the Papuan students emerged soon after, and they could clearly be heard calling the Papuans “monkeys” and “dogs”.
The violent protests and deadly riots began soon afterwards in the regional capitals of Jayapura and Manokwari, and in smaller cities such as Timika, Sorong, Fakfak and in regencies such as Deiyai.
As is often the case with Papua, it’s difficult to verify many of the claims and counter-claims that are made by the government and independence supporters.
Between four and seven civilians and one soldier died during clashes in Deiyai regency on August 28 (the government has disputed the number of civilians killed and it’s not clear what the final number is).
Another man died during a gun battle on August 23, and four civilians died during clashes in Jayapura, the capital of Papua, on September 1.
By September 5, the situation seemed to quieten down, though that could change at a moment’s notice. The government has estimated that repairs to government buildings damaged in the riots will cost at least $7 million.
During this bout of trouble, President Joko Widodo has called for calm in the two provinces, condemned the racist attacks in Surabaya and, in a recent meeting with the editors of major newspapers, talked up a “prosperity approach” to addressing the provinces’ grievances, according to the Jakarta Post.
Joko’s approach, essentially, means more investment in infrastructure and development to tackle poverty and disadvantage. He has spent more time in Papua, and invested more money in sorely needed infrastructure, than any previous Indonesian leader.
One of his signature projects is the 4325-kilometre trans-Papua highway, a road network that will link cities including Jayapura and the West Papuan capital, Manokwari. (Critics have raised concerns about the environmental damage caused by the project, and have argued it is being constructed so that more of the country’s resources can be exploited.)
But Joko is coming off a very low base and critics argue he has not done enough to improve the human rights situation, or addressed demands for a referendum.
Meanwhile, Jakarta has sent in about 6000 extra police and soldiers, and Army commander Hadi Tjahjanto and national Police Chief General Tito Karnavian have both flown to Papua.
Internet services were slowed down, and then mostly shut off, with the government arguing this would stop the spread of hoaxes and slow down the organisation of protests. The internet blackout had ended in most parts of Papua by September 5.
More than 50 people have been named as suspects for participating in various protests, and arrests of protesters have been made. Two members of the military are being investigated. Indonesian police have vowed to hunt down separatists blamed for the violent protests.
Jakarta blames Benny Wenda, the leader of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua who lives in exile in the UK, for helping stir up the trouble. It has also charged human rights lawyer Veronica Koman with “incitement” for tweets they claim were hoax news.
Could Papua be granted an independence referendum?
After meeting Joko, the Governor of Papua, Lukas Enembe, told reporters last week that the President was willing to discuss an independence referendum.
But it’s difficult to see that happening. The Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Wiranto, has dismissed a referendum out of hand. He is a former military general who was a key figure in the events that led up to the 1999 referendum on East Timor’s independence, and he opposed that independence movement too.
Joko has spoken about the need for dialogue between supporters of independence and the government. Allowing an independence referendum would cause him huge problems in Jakarta and damage him politically at the start of his second and final term.
SEPTEMBER 6, 2019
low-level insurgency has bubbled away in the Indonesian provinces of Papua and West Papua since the early 1960s, when Dutch colonialists withdrew from the territory and Indonesia moved in as temporary administrators.
A referendum on independence was agreed under a UN-brokered deal but the vote, held in 1969 and widely regarded as a sham (some have nicknamed it the “act of no choice”), allowed just 1026 locals chosen by Indonesia to vote – and they voted unanimously for incorporation into Indonesia.
The most recent protests have seen several people killed, buildings set on fire and violence on the streets. Thousands of people have taken part in protests all over the country, flying the banned Morning Star flag and demanding independence.
Indonesian authorities deported four Australians from West Papua. It was alleged they had participated in pro-independence protests.
So what is behind all the tension in Papua? Why are these protests happening now? And what will Indonesia do about them?
The current unrest is diplomatically sensitive for Australia and Indonesia – memories of Australia’s key role in East Timor’s independence have not faded. Some in the Jakarta political and military establishment fear Australia could one day come out in support of Papuan independence but successive governments have stressed that Australia respects Indonesia’s territorial integrity.
Papua, formerly known as Irian Jaya, is on Australia’s doorstep – it’s only about 500 kilometres away as the crow flies – and Australia is home to many Papuan activists who advocate for an independent Papua.
West Papua and Papua are on the same island as Papua New Guinea, which occupies the eastern side of the land mass. PNG has never been part of Indonesia.
About 3.5 million people live in Indonesian Papua, a tiny fraction of Indonesia’s population of about 260 million people. It was only in 2003 that West Papua was hived off and a second province created. Together, the provinces were once known as Irian Jaya, but the name Papua was adopted (in line with local preferences) soon after former president Megawati Sukarnoputri granted limited autonomy to the province in 2002.
This autonomy allowed the provinces to retain most of the revenue generated from the extraction of natural resources such as oil and gas – deposits of gold, copper, silver, petroleum, natural gas and coal are also still largely untapped. It was also designed to head off the desire for Papuan independence.
And it was hoped that additional autonomy would help lift Papuans out of grinding poverty. Papua and West Papua are two of the poorest, most corrupt provinces in Indonesia. The poverty rate is more than 20 per cent compared to a national rate of 9.4 per cent.
The World Bank notes that, although the provinces are rich in resources, economic development is “unusually challenging” because of geography – “steep mountains, swampy lowlands, fragile soils and heavy seasonal rainfall” – and due to low population density and extreme cultural fragmentation.
On average, people earn less and don’t live as long. The two provinces lack access to basic services such as health and education. They also lack crucial infrastructure compared to much of the rest of the country.
Providing some autonomy hasn’t really worked to head off trouble. Deadly clashes between armed rebels and Indonesian security forces are a regular occurrence, as are attacks on workers building a new trans-Papua highway and on resources projects such as the huge Grasberg gold and copper mine (in which Indonesia last year took a majority stake).
The most recent protests began soon after August 17, Indonesia’s national independence day, when 43 Papuan students in Surabaya, East Java, were arrested for allegedly damaging the Indonesian flag.
Video of security forces who arrested the Papuan students emerged soon after, and they could clearly be heard calling the Papuans “monkeys” and “dogs”.
The violent protests and deadly riots began soon afterwards in the regional capitals of Jayapura and Manokwari, and in smaller cities such as Timika, Sorong, Fakfak and in regencies such as Deiyai.
As is often the case with Papua, it’s difficult to verify many of the claims and counter-claims that are made by the government and independence supporters.
Between four and seven civilians and one soldier died during clashes in Deiyai regency on August 28 (the government has disputed the number of civilians killed and it’s not clear what the final number is).
Another man died during a gun battle on August 23, and four civilians died during clashes in Jayapura, the capital of Papua, on September 1.
By September 5, the situation seemed to quieten down, though that could change at a moment’s notice. The government has estimated that repairs to government buildings damaged in the riots will cost at least $7 million.
During this bout of trouble, President Joko Widodo has called for calm in the two provinces, condemned the racist attacks in Surabaya and, in a recent meeting with the editors of major newspapers, talked up a “prosperity approach” to addressing the provinces’ grievances, according to the Jakarta Post.
Joko’s approach, essentially, means more investment in infrastructure and development to tackle poverty and disadvantage. He has spent more time in Papua, and invested more money in sorely needed infrastructure, than any previous Indonesian leader.
One of his signature projects is the 4325-kilometre trans-Papua highway, a road network that will link cities including Jayapura and the West Papuan capital, Manokwari. (Critics have raised concerns about the environmental damage caused by the project, and have argued it is being constructed so that more of the country’s resources can be exploited.)
But Joko is coming off a very low base and critics argue he has not done enough to improve the human rights situation, or addressed demands for a referendum.
Meanwhile, Jakarta has sent in about 6000 extra police and soldiers, and Army commander Hadi Tjahjanto and national Police Chief General Tito Karnavian have both flown to Papua.
Internet services were slowed down, and then mostly shut off, with the government arguing this would stop the spread of hoaxes and slow down the organisation of protests. The internet blackout had ended in most parts of Papua by September 5.
More than 50 people have been named as suspects for participating in various protests, and arrests of protesters have been made. Two members of the military are being investigated. Indonesian police have vowed to hunt down separatists blamed for the violent protests.
Jakarta blames Benny Wenda, the leader of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua who lives in exile in the UK, for helping stir up the trouble. It has also charged human rights lawyer Veronica Koman with “incitement” for tweets they claim were hoax news.
Could Papua be granted an independence referendum?
After meeting Joko, the Governor of Papua, Lukas Enembe, told reporters last week that the President was willing to discuss an independence referendum.
But it’s difficult to see that happening. The Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Wiranto, has dismissed a referendum out of hand. He is a former military general who was a key figure in the events that led up to the 1999 referendum on East Timor’s independence, and he opposed that independence movement too.
Joko has spoken about the need for dialogue between supporters of independence and the government. Allowing an independence referendum would cause him huge problems in Jakarta and damage him politically at the start of his second and final term.
Dear Editor,
The Public have recently been informed by the Chairman of the Revenue Review Committee that Australia through their Governance for Growth Program, are the major Donor in the Revenue Review Process with the introduction of Australian style Taxes on the Citizens and Businesses of Vanuatu.
The following questions are directed to the Head of the Governance for Growth Program on behalf of all Vanuatu Citizens.
4. The GfG Program Design Document has numerous references to the importance of dialogue with the Private Sector. (Clauses 22, 45, 89, 93, 94, 99, 154). Outline in detail the Private Sector dialogue prior to the decision to proceed with the funding for the introduction of these additional complex and complicated taxes.
5. What is the progress with the Governance for Growth Program Design Document Phase lll, and are there any plans to involve the Private Sector in its development?
Yours Sincerely,
Ian G. Kerr.
Australian Tax Payer and Vanuatu Investor.
Member of the Vanuatu Public
Women soldiers from the Free Aceh Movement. Photo: Wikimedia commons
Fabio Scarpello – 09 Mar, 2017, New Mandala
Almost 20 years since Reformasi, Aceh and Papua still face major stumbling blocks to development and peace, writes Fabio Scarpello.
Almost 20 years since the student-led reformasi movement contributed to the fall of the Suharto regime in May 1998, the two restive regions of Aceh and Papua remain troubled. Both regions have experienced long-lasting separatist movements that grew in momentum after the end of authoritarianism. They have since followed different trajectories and are now experiencing different sets of problem.
Post-Suharto, the secessionist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) grew to control much of Aceh’s countryside, leading to the government placing the province under martial law and launching its largest ever military operation in 2003. The conflict, which had started in 1979, eventually ended when the magnitude of the December 2004 Tsunami dwarfed both Jakarta and GAM’s political ambitions and forced them to sit at the negotiation table. On 5 August 2005, representatives of the Indonesian government and GAM reached a peace settlement as GAM dropped its call for independence, and Jakarta conceded a large amount of autonomy to the province and withdrew most of the military (TNI).
On 11 July 2006, the Indonesian House of Representatives adopted the Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA), a document that codified some of the key points of the peace agreement. This laid the foundation for lasting peace by dealing with some of the grievances of Acehnese. In particular, the national government financially compensated and supported Aceh by increasing its share of national budget streams until 2028. The LoGA crucially also allowed GAM members to partake in electoral politics as independent candidates at first, and then via the establishment of local political parties later on. Both were exceptions in the Indonesian context at that time
GAM became Partai Aceh in 2008, but even prior to that former GAM rapidly rose to control the political and economic landscape at provincial and district levels. This did not lead to a happy ending, though, as GAM quickly fragmented into factions competing for access to power and resources and intra-GAM political violence has since escalated. The Aceh Election Supervisory Committee recorded 57 cases of political violence during the 2006 gubernatorial election, 91 during the 2009 legislative and presidential election, and 167 during the 2012 gubernatorial election. These include politically motivated killings, kidnapping, vandalism, as well as widespread intimidation and threats to voters. The most recent intra-GAM split has emerged between current governor, Zaini Abdullah, and vice governor, Muzzakir Manaf, both of whom are jostling for position for the forthcoming gubernatorial election, as documented by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict.
In the meantime, the benefits of peace are yet to trickle down to the 4.4 million people with corruption and patronage still endemic. Aceh remains among Indonesia’s poorest provinces with almost one-third of households in the rural areas living below the poverty line, according to the UNDP. Many Acehnese now openly say that GAM has failed to introduce clean and good governance and pro-poor initiatives, but simply replaced the military and Jakarta’s lackeys in exploiting local resources. As I was able to ascertain during a recent fieldtrip to the province, some among the former rebels openly talk about returning to war. It is unclear who their enemy is, though.
Papua has followed a different trajectory. In this easternmost region of Indonesia, the end of the Suharto regime was greeted with a renewed push for independence. Pro-independence sympathy is widespread in Papua, and the province has experienced sporadic violence since its incorporation into Indonesia in 1969. Indigenous Papuans have resented both the settling of migrants from other areas of Indonesia and the exploitation of Papua’s natural resources by the Indonesian government and international corporations.
However, Papua’s rebel group – the Free Papua Movement (OPM) – has never commanded the support that GAM enjoyed, nor has it been as disciplined, well-trained and active as its Acehnese counterpart. The OPM’s main weakness has always been its fragmentation, which is rooted in Papua’s extreme level of social diversity. The roughly 1.8 million native Papuans are splintered into more than 312 tribes, and although anti-Indonesian sentiments have helped create an overarching Papuan identity, it has not dislodged primary loyalty to separate tribes.
Partly because of OPM’s weakness, the pro-independence movement has mostly be driven by non-violent, political means with the most vocal pro-independence voices found in the student organisations, and various Christian churches present in the region where most of the population is Christian.
After the fall of Suharto, a delegation of 100 Papuans met Indonesian president BJ Habibie in Jakarta in February 1999 and stated their wish for independence. The climax of this peaceful push for freedom was the Second Papua People’s Congress, in Jayapura, a few months later, attended by an estimated 15,000 people. But Papua suffered no tsunami, and there has been no real catalyst for meaningful changes.
A 2001 Special Autonomy Law was the central government’s only significant attempt to reach out to the Papuans. Although wide in principle, autonomy has never been implemented and has only served to further increase Papuans distrust of Jakarta. On the other hand, Jakarta has continued to militarise the region; split the region into two separate provinces (Papua and West Papua) contravening its own Special Autonomy Law; and never stopped facilitating the migration of Muslim Javanese to the region. According to the 2010 census, the combined population of Papua and West Papua is now 3,593,803, of which slightly more than half are non-Papuan Indonesian settlers and their offspring.
Papuans have told me that they believe they are victims of a slow “cultural and religious genocide”. The word “genocide” was used in this context in a 2004 Yale University report, which argued that the influx of non-Papuan Indonesians was diluting the ethnic Papuans to a point that could be considered “the act element of genocide”.
Among the pro-independence activists the hope is to involve the international community to force Indonesia to hold a referendum on independence. This internationalisation strategy has so far only gathered the support of some Pacific Island nations and isolated western politicians. During last September’s meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum, Dame Meg Taylor, Secretary General of the Forum, said that West Papua is a sensitive issue for some Pacific governments, but one that needs to be debated.
Jakarta is not listening though, and geopolitical reasons mean that neither is the United Nations or the regional democratic powers, Australia and New Zealand.
Fabio Scarpello is a Research Fellow at the Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University.
This article is a translation from Italian and based on a paper published in RISE — a publication on Southeast Asia from the Torino World Affairs Institute (Twai).
By Dan McGarry in Port Vila
AUCKLAND, New Zealand (Asia Pacific Report, Feb. 1, 2017) – Last month, New Zealand-based analyst Jose Sousa-Santos commented on Twitter that “Indonesia’s attempt at buying support from the Pacific region seems to have little to no impact on Melanesia’s stance on [West] Papua.”
That’s one of those pesky observations that’s neither entirely right nor entirely wrong. The truth is: Indonesia is winning almost every battle… and still losing the fight.
Conventional wisdom used to be that Indonesia had built an impregnable firewall against Melanesian action in support of West Papuan independence.
Its commercial and strategic relationship with Papua New Guinea is such that PNG’s foreign affairs establishment will frankly admit that their support for Indonesia’s territorial claims is axiomatic. Call it realpolitik or call it timidity, but they feel that the West Papuan independence doesn’t even bear contemplating.
Widespread grassroots support and its popularity among progressive up-and-comers such as Gary Juffa don’t seem to matter. As long as Jakarta holds the key to economic and military tranquillity, Port Moresby’s elites are content to toe the Indonesian line.
The situation in Suva is similar. FijiFirst is naturally inclined is toward a more authoritarian approach to governance. And it seems that the military’s dominance of Fiji’s political landscape dovetails nicely with Indonesia’s power dynamic.
Many argue that Fiji’s relationship is largely mercenary. It wouldn’t flourish, they say, if the path to entente weren’t strewn with cash and development assistance. That’s probably true, but we can’t ignore the sincere cordiality between Fiji’s leadership and their Indonesian counterparts.
The same seeds have been planted in Port Vila, but they haven’t take root.
Until recently, Indonesia’s ability to derail consensus in the Melanesian Spearhead Group has ensured that West Papuan independence leaders lacked even a toehold on the international stage. In the absence of international recognition and legitimacy, the Indonesian government was able to impose draconian restrictions on activists both domestically and internationally.
Perhaps the most notorious example was their alleged campaign to silence independence leader Benny Wenda, who fled Indonesia after facing what he claims were politically motivated charges designed to silence him. He was granted political asylum in the United Kingdom, but a subsequent red notice—usually reserved for terrorists and international criminals—made travel impossible.
In mid-2012, following an appeal by human rights organisation Fair Trials, Interpol admitted that Indonesia’s red notice against Wenda was “predominantly political in nature”, and removed it.
Since then, however, activists have accused Indonesia of abusing anti-terrorism mechanisms to curtail Wenda’s travels. A trip to the United States was cancelled at the last moment because American authorities refused to let him board his flight. It was alleged that an Indonesian complaint was the source of this refusal.
Independence supporters claim that Indonesian truculence has also led to Mr Wenda being barred from addressing the New Zealand parliament. His appearance at the Sydney opera house with human rights lawyer Jennifer Robinson received a standing ovation from the 2500 audience members… and an irate protest from Indonesian officials.
Not all of Indonesia’s efforts are overt. Numerous commentators made note of the fact that Vanuatu’s then-foreign minister Sato Kilman visited Jakarta immediately before his 2015 ouster of Prime Minister Joe Natuman.
Natuman, a lifelong supporter of West Papuan independence, was a stalwart backer of membership in the MSG for the United Liberation Movement for West Papua, or ULMWP. He was unseated barely weeks before the Honiara meeting that was to consider the question.
Kilman, along with Indonesian officials, vehemently deny any behind-the-scenes collusion on West Papua.
But even with Vanuatu wavering, something happened at the June 2015 Honiara meeting that surprised everyone. Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare stage-managed a diplomatic coup, a master class in Melanesian mediation.
In June 2015, I wrote that the “Solomonic decision by the Melanesian Spearhead Group to cut the baby in half and boost the membership status of both the ULMWP and Indonesia is an example of the Melanesian political mind at work. Valuing collective peace over individual justice, group prosperity over individual advancement, and allowing unabashed self-interest to leaven the sincerity of the entire process, our leaders have placed their stamp on what just might be an indelible historical moment.”
Since then, the sub-regional dynamic has undergone a transformation. Kilman’s administration suffered a collapse of unprecedented proportions following corruption charges against more than half of his government.
The resulting public furore seems—for the moment at least— to have catalysed a backlash against venality and personal interest.
If the rumours are true, and Indonesia did have a hand in Kilman’s palace coup, the tactic hasn’t worked since. A pair of no confidence motions—not very coincidentally on the eve of yet another MSG leaders’ summit—failed even to reach the debate stage.
Kanaky’s support for West Papuan independence has never wavered, but given their semi-governmental status, and their staunch socialist platform, Jakarta would be hard pressed to find a lever it could usefully pull.
For his part, Sogavare has survived more than one attempt to topple him. His own party leaders explicitly referenced his leadership on the West Papuan question when they tried to oust him by withdrawing their support.
In a masterful—and probably unlawful—manoeuvre, Sogavare retained his hold on power by getting the other coalition members to endorse him as their leader. His deft handling of the onslaught has raised him in the estimation of many observers of Melanesian politics.
Some claim that his dodging and weaving has placed him in the first rank of Melanesia’s political pantheon.
In Vanuatu as well, once bitten is twice shy. Prime Minister Charlot Salwai raised eyebrows when he not only met with the ULMWP leadership, but accepted the salute of a contingent of freedom fighters in full military regalia.
The meeting took place at the same moment as MSG foreign ministers met to consider rule changes that, if enacted, will almost inevitably result in full membership for the ULMWP.
The MSG has traditionally operated on consensus. If these rule changes pass muster, this will no longer be the case. It is a near certainty that Indonesia will do its utmost to avert this.
Sogavare has demonstrated an inspired approach to the situation: If the MSG won’t stand for decolonisation in the Pacific, he asks, what is it good for? This rhetoric has become a chorus, with senior politicians in Vanuatu and Kanaky joining in.
Sogavare is, in short, embarked on his own march to Selma. And he is willing to allow the MSG to suffer the slings and arrows of Indonesian opprobrium. He is, in short, willing to allow the MSG to die for their sins.
Whether we agree or not with the independence campaign, there is no denying the genius of Sogavare’s ploy. His willingness to sacrifice the MSG for the cause takes away the one lever that Indonesia had in Melanesia.
His key role in orchestrating an end run around the Pacific Islands Forum’s wilful silence is another trademark move. When human rights concerns were simply glossed over in the communiqué, he and others orchestrated a chorus of calls for attention to the issue in the UN General Assembly.
Manasseh Sogavare and his Pacific allies have found a strategy that is making the advancement of the West Papuan independence movement inexorable. As Ghandi demonstrated in India, as with Dr King’s campaign for civil rights showed again and again, anything less than defeat is a victory.
Without losing a single major battle, Indonesia is—slowly, so slowly—being forced from the board.
Dan McGarry is media director of the Vanuatu Daily Post.
Asia Pacific Report
All editorial and news content produced under the principles of Creative Commons. Permission to republish with attribution may be obtained from the Pacific Media Centre – pmc@aut.ac.nz
Dr. Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, originally from the Solomon Islands, is an associate professor at the Center for Pacific Islands Studies, University of Hawai’i. The views expressed here are his personal opinions.
West Papua will be the most high profile issue at the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) leaders’ summit in Honiara, Solomon Islands, on 24–26 June 2015.
The MSG leaders will decide on the United Liberation Movement for West Papua’s (ULMWP) application for membership of the MSG. This is an organisation consisting of the four Melanesian countries – Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji – and New Caledonia’s pro-Independence movement, the Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS).
If they admit the ULMWP, it could boost the pro-independence movement’s push for self-determination and provide an international venue to highlight the Indonesian Government’s human rights violations in West Papua. But, it could also have negative impacts on the Melanesian countries’ relations with Indonesia. This will be particularly worrying for PNG and Fiji that have growing economic, political and military partnerships with Jakarta. It could also setback Indonesia’s bid to pose itself as an emerging Asia-Pacific power.
On the other hand, if the MSG leaders deny the ULMWP membership, it could widen the rift between MSG countries. It could also redefine Melanesia, blur the cultural and political divisions between Oceania and Southeast Asia, and see a Melanesian sub-region dominated by Indonesia.
The MSG leaders are therefore faced with the difficult task of balancing, on one hand, their moral obligation to support Melanesians in West Papua, and on the other hand, respecting Indonesia’s sovereignty and maintaining their growing political and economic relations with this emerging Southeast Asian power.
This will be the second time West Papua’s pro-independence movements bid for MSG membership. The first was in October 2013 when an application by the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL) was unsuccessful.
Part of the reason was concerns that
WPNCL did not represent all the pro-independence groups in West Papua. Since then, the West Papuans have formed the ULMWP, which they claim is more representative.
It was also because of intense lobbying by Indonesia, which has an observer status on the MSG.
In January 2014, Jakarta invited the MSG Foreign Ministers to visit Indonesia and “witness first-hand conditions in West Papua.”
The mission was headed the Fiji’s Foreign Minister, but boycotted by Vanuatu whose Foreign Minister argued, “the visit would only talk with the Indonesians and do business with the Indonesians, it had nothing to do with West Papua.” Indeed, the MSG Foreign Ministers were given only fleeting and restricted visits to Jakarta, Bali and West Papua.
This time, it seems there will again be a split in the MSG. Vanuatu and the FLNKS are likely to support West Papua’s bid for membership.
Vanuatu has always been a firm supporter of West Papuan independence and the FLNKS is sympathetic, given its own struggles for independence from France. But, the change of government in Port Vila last week and the election of Sato Kilman as Prime Minister casts doubts on how Vanuatu will vote. Kilman had earlier been sacked as Foreign Minister because “he misrepresented Vanuatu’s position over the West Papua issue.”
Solomon Islands has not made a firm commitment. Instead, Foreign Minister, Milner Tozaka, states that the Solomon Islands Government will “. . . go along with a united MSG stand.”
It is unclear what this means. But, it is indicative of the fact that Solomon Islands has never been decisive on the West Papua issue, choosing instead the shroud of vague diplomatic language. But, it also means that Solomon Islands could hold the balance in the MSG’s decision on West Papua’s application for membership.
Interestingly, Solomon Islands played a leading role in pushing for French Polynesia to be re-enlisted on the UN’s Decolonization list.
During the UN General Assembly meeting in May 2013, the Solomon Islands’ Ambassador to the UN, Collin Beck, introduced the resolution, supported by Nauru, Tuvalu, Samoa, Vanuatu and East Timor.
Beck told the UN General Assembly there was “wide international support” for putting French Polynesia back on the list and that, “The map of decolonizing remains an unfinished business of the United Nations.”
Yet, Solomon Islands is reluctant to support West Papua’s application for membership of the MSG.
Fiji and PNG will likely vote against ULMWP membership, or attempt to water down West Papua’s participation in efforts to save their relations with Indonesia. They prefer “non-interference” in Indonesia’s sovereign affairs, citing West Papua as a domestic issue.
PNG shares a border with Indonesia/West Papua.
And although it is directly affected by the conflicts in West Papua, has always been reluctant to speak out against Indonesian occupation.
In October 1986, PNG signed the “Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship, and Cooperation” with Indonesia, which frames the relationship between the two countries.
In 1988, PNG’s then Foreign Minister, Akoka Doi, said that Port Moresby recognizes West Papua as “an integral part of Indonesia.” It was, in his words, a “mistake done by the colonial powers so let it stay as it is.”
But, more recently, it seems opinions in the haus tambaran in Waigani have changed.
In February, in a carefully crafted statement, PNG’s Prime Minister, Peter O’Neill, expressed concern about Indonesia’s human rights abuses in West Papua. He states, “. . . the time has come for us to speak about [the] oppression [of] our people.
Pictures of brutality of our people appear daily on social media and yet we take no notice. We have the moral obligation to speak for those who are not allowed to talk. We must be the eyes for those who are blindfolded.
Again, Papua New Guinea, as a regional leader, we must lead these discussions with our friends in a mature and engaging manner.” This was, to date, his strongest statement on the issue, referring to the Melanesian West Papuans as “our family,” “our brothers and sisters,” and “our people.”
But, in March, O’Neill told a gathering at the Lowey Institute in Sydney that he prefers that West Papua’s Provincial Governors represent West Papua at the MSG.
In other words, he wants Indonesian government representatives to be the mouthpiece for West Papua at the MSG.
The Fiji Government has never been an advocator for West Papua.
It joined the MSG in 1998; a decade after the MSG was conceived in 1983 and formalized in March 1988 with the signing of the “Agreed Principles for Cooperation.” Fiji joined mainly because it saw the potential benefits from the MSG Trade Agreement that PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu signed in 1993.
Its first engagement with the MSG was at the Trade and Economic Officials’ Meeting in Honiara in April 1997. It could therefore be argued that Fiji’s membership of the MSG was driven largely by economic imperatives, rather than concerns for human rights and self-determination.
In contrast, Fiji has a longer history of flirting with Indonesia. The two countries established diplomatic relations in 1974, but became actively engaged in the late 1980s. Following Fiji’s first coup, and as a result of being marginalized by traditional allies, the Sitiveni Rabuka-led government turned to Jakarta. In November 1987, a eight-member Indonesian trade mission arrived in Suva and held talks with the then Foreign Minister, Filipe Bole, offering Fiji up to 25,000 tons of rice on credit and special financial facilities, as a “goodwill gesture.” Along with that, the then Indonesian military boss, General Benny Murdani, expressed interests in forging military cooperation with Fiji.
The current Fijian Government continues the strong tie with Indonesia.
In May 2011 Suva and Jakarta signed a Development Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that covers a wide range of sectors, including Agriculture, Fisheries and Marine Resources, Forestry, Trade & Investments, Education, Legal & Judicial Sector, Defense, Police, Tourism etc.
In March 2015, the Fijian Foreign Affairs Minister, Ratu Inoke Kubuabola, met his Indonesian counterpart, Retno Marsudi, in Nadi to discuss enhancing trade cooperation in fisheries, agriculture processing and in the marketing of their various products. While Indonesia is presently not Fiji’s largest trading partner, the value of trade between the two countries is significant.
It was Fiji’s Prime Minister, Frank Bainimarama, who pushed for Indonesia to become an observer on the MSG in 2011. Last month, he proposed that Indonesia be made an associate member of the MSG, adding that “Papua comes under the governance of Indonesia and if you want to do anything in Papua, the best thing to do is to bring in Indonesia, no matter what, if we bring in Papua separately, it doesn’t make sense.”
Bainimarama’s statement conveniently ignores the fraudulent processes that led to Indonesia’s annexation of West Papua, including the US-brokered New York Agreement of August 1962 that facilitated the Netherland’s handover of West Papua to Indonesia. It also ignores the questionable 1969 Act of Free Choice and the human rights abuses and atrocities that Indonesia committed in the past fifty years, including the killing of about 500,000 Melanesian West Papuans.
Given its relationship with Indonesia, it is unlikely Fiji will support West Papua’s application for MSG membership. Fiji’s policy on this issue is driven by economic imperatives, rather than moral obligations. Bainimarama will use this MSG summit to seek endorsement for Fiji’s political agendas, including its attempts to expel Australia and New Zealand as members of the Pacific Islands Forum, making them participate only as donor partners.
As the MSG prepares to discuss West Papua’s application for membership, one could ask: Why should West Papua be given MSG membership? Will MSG membership help address West Papua’s issues? How can the MSG countries address the West Papua issue while maintaining cordial relationships with Indonesia? There is no space here to answer these questions. But, in seeking answers, three issues are pertinent.
First, it is important to note that sovereignty is not absolute. In the past two decades, we have seen an increase in international interventions in situations where human rights have been violated and atrocities committed.
The reasons for and nature of interventions vary, but there is definitely an international willingness to “infringe” Westphalian notions of sovereignty in order to hold states accountable to universal principles.
We have seen this from East Timor to Kosovo, from Sierra Leone to Sudan, and from Angola to Afghanistan. On the other hand, the case of Rwanda demonstrates the cost of when the international community stood by and did too little, too late.
As the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, said in September 1999, “State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined – not least by the forces of globalization and international cooperation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa.
At the same time individual sovereignty – by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights.
When we read the charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.”
West Papua is not the same as East Timor, Sierre Leone, Sudan, Angola, Afghanistan, Kosovo, etc.
But, the international community must hold the Indonesian state accountable for more than fifty years of human rights abuses and the murder of about 500,000 West Papuans. “Intervention” does not have to be by military force. It can be a “diplomatic intervention” that holds Indonesia accountable, reminding Jakarta that its sovereignty is not absolute.
The MSG could, and should, take on that responsibility, not only because of ethnic affinity with indigenous West Papuans, but because of universal human rights principles.
It will not be easy, given Indonesia’s growing economic, political and military power in Southeast Asia and its alliance with the US, Australia and other Western powers. But, it is a noble and worthwhile engagement. It is time to take decisive action by admitting West Papua to the MSG.
Second, there is a need to redress the fraudulent processes that led to Indonesia’s annexation of West Papua.
This discussion should be taken to the United Nations. There have been suggestions for a legal approach – one that challenges the transfers of sovereignty from the Dutch to the Indonesian government.
This is an approach favored by the International Lawyers for West Papua and Vanuatu. In June 2010, the Vanuatu parliament unanimously passed a motion calling on the International Court of Justice (IJC) to investigate the legality of West Papua’s transfer from the Dutch to Indonesia.
But, as Australian academics, Jason MacLeod and Brian Martin indicate, there are risks with the legal strategy.
These include the fact that it will require considerable money and resources, legal strategies usually favor the powerful, it could dampen wide spread civil society activism both within and outside of West Papua, and there is the risk that the case might never be heard because of technical legal issues.
More importantly, MacLeod and Martin state, “A failure to win the case, even on technical grounds, could undermine the cause for self-determination by giving a legal stamp of approval to the Act of Free Choice.” They argue that, “The case of West Papua is essentially about power politics and vested economic interests.
Therefore, winning the ‘court of public opinion’ (in other words, building a powerful social movement) and raising the political and economic costs of the Indonesian government’s continued occupation will be more decisive than a legal victory.” West Papua’s membership of the MSG could add to Indonesia’s political costs.
Third, West Papua had historical associations with Oceania prior to the Indonesian takeover. In his book, “Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West,” the late Professor Ron Crocombe notes that, “Until Indonesia took over, West Papuans took part in the South Pacific Commission and its training courses and conferences, West Papua Churches participated in the Pacific church conferences, and West Papuans studied at the Central Medical School and the Pacific Theological College in Fiji, and at other PNG and regional institutions. When Indonesia took over West Papua in 1963, all West Papuan participation in regional activities was stopped.” This calls for Oceanian responsibility.
The MSG should therefore seriously consider West Papua’s application for membership. The worse thing that could happen would be to admit Indonesia as an “associate member.” That would be an insult to West Papuans and desecrate the original intent, impetus and spirit for establishing the MSG. It could also result in Indonesia’s domination of Melanesia.
As the Melanesia’s Big Men gather in Nahona Ara (Honiara), the cries and blood of West Papuans will hang heavy in the town’s humid air. There is a lot at stake. West Papua is an issue that could make, or break Melanesia.
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West Papua National Flag – The Morning Star